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Introduction
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist
voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. In recent years,
they have been widely adopted, (see Marschall, Chapter Seven in this volume)
but their design is the subject of ongoing and often heated criticism (see the
various chapters by van Camp el al., Gemenis and van Ham, and Mendez in
this volume). Most of these debates focus on whether VAAs accurately measure
the standpoints of political parties and the preferences of users and on whether
they report valid results while avoiding political bias. It is generally assumed
that if their methodology is sound, then VAAs can be seen as strengthening the
democratic process. But as we argue in this chapter, the setup of VAAs raises basic
questions of normative democratic theory as well. Insofar as VAAs are supposed
to improve the functioning of the democratic process, it must be clarified in what
sense they aim to make a contribution, before it even makes sense to discuss their
effectiveness at doing so.
VAAs are often intended to enhance the democratic process by one or all of
the following: (I) informing voters about the policy standpoints of political parties
(or individual candidates), (2) increasing voter turnout, and (3) ensuring that the
composition of parliaments more accurately reflects the political attitudes of the
electorate. In the next three sections, we discuss three central bones of contention
in current democratic theory that are crucial to these ways in which VAAs typically
take themselves to contribute to strengthening the democratic process:
I. Questions about citizen competence: What forms of competence do
citizens need to have, and to what extent, for a democracy to function
properly?
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2. Questions about political participation: What forms and extent o f
participation are vital to democracy?
3. Questions about democratic representation: How should the relation
between the elected and the electorate be understood?
For each issue we aim to show, first, how the design and setup of mainstream
VAAs are tacitly structured by a specific conception of the democratic aim at
issue and, second, what some alternative positions on these questions are within
contemporary political theory. In the final section, we will discuss some of the
implications of this analysis for the responsibilities of VAA developers, and
particularly for the procedural neutrality to which they are typically committed.
Our conclusion will be that once these issues are identified, developers of
VAAs should either argue in favour of their views on democratic competence,
participation and representation, or they should rethink the design of VA As in
ways that move beyond their current assumptions, or both.
VAAs and citizen competence
The most prominent claim about how VAAs strengthen democracies is that they
address long standing concerns with voter ignorance. The literature on voter
ignorance and citizen incompetence makes clear that the majority of citizens have
low levels of political knowledge, reason irrationally about the best means to
realise their ends, and exhibit widespread, predictable biases in their preferences
for candidates, parties and standpoints (DeIli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Caplan
2008; Brennan 2011). Some of this is contested, of course, in particular whether
ignorance about matters of geography or history is really such a threat to a well-
functioning democracy (Lupla 2006) and whether certain cues can serve as reliable
heuristics (Goren 2012). But there are also ample grounds for doubting that voters
know what they are choosing when they cast a ballot for a candidate or party
(Somin 2006), and it certainly seems problematic for voters to choose on the basis
of mistaken beliefs about the political positions of candidates and/or parties, for it
means that the ballots cast may have little to do with what voters actually find to
be important.
As we have argued elsewhere (Fossen and Anderson, forthcoming), this
ignorance about where the parties (or candidates) stand is the form of citizen
incompetence that VAAs aim, above all, to address. More precisely, they aim
to help close a 'competence gap' (Anderson 2009) between how well informed
voters actually are, and how well informed they would need to be for the electoral
process to function properly.2 To the extent to which one views democratic
2. S i nce  we are here making exclusively a formal point about the VAA design needing to address
this point, we can refrain from taking a substantive position on what would count as the 'proper
function'. It is worth adding that normative issues could include concerns with the comparative
size of the competence gaps among citizens and the resulting threats to political equality. (We
would like to thank Stefan Marschall for raising this issue with us.)
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electoral systems as premised on voters knowing what they are voting for, the
potential for a problematic competence gap looms large, especially when sorting
out the positions of parties and candidates turns out to be a demanding task, as
is often the case in multiparty parliamentary systems. Voters need to be able to
sift through lengthy party programs and sort out the claims and counterclaims
made about what parties' positions really are, even as the parties do their best to
obscure the differences, so as to appeal to as many voters as possible. Thus, even
assuming wide-spread access to information and high levels of literacy, the level
of political knowledge presupposed by this conception of a democratic electoral
system can exceed what most citizens have (or take the time to develop). On the
assumption that there are significant competence gaps here, VAAs aim to close
such competence gaps by leveraging voters' limited knowledge and time (Garzia
2010).
To the extent to which voters are ignorant of parties' actual positions, the
democratic contribution of current VAAs would seem uncontroversial. And yet
the exclusive focus on this aspect of citizen incompetence - ignorance about party
positions - reveals an implicit commitment to issue voting as a normative principle.
The typical setup of current VAAs, centred around a set of statements on policy
issues, assumes that competent voting is a matter of finding the party whose stand
on current issues best fits with one's political preferences. This 'matching model'
of VAAs assumes that citizens lack accurate knowledge of the policy programs
of political parties (or candidates), even though they have fairly clear and stable
policy preferences on which they are expected to base their vote. But there are
strong currents within political theory that challenge this model. To illustrate how
contentious this conception of competent voting actually is, consider the following
three challenges to it in current political theory.
First, consider the analysis developed within the family of political theories
referred to as agonism. The defining characteristic of agonistic political theory
is its refusal to equate 'democracy' with existing electoral practice, emphasising
democracy's dynamic character and the contestability of a given implementation
of democratic ideals (Mouffe 2000; Honig 2007; Tully 2008; for an overview,
see Fossen 2008). While current VAAs help voters to orient themselves within
a given electoral landscape, agonistic theorists would argue that this treats the
status quo of mainstream discourse as a given and depoliticises the selection of
issues on the public agenda. From this perspective, the greater concern is that
citizens lack the critical attitude and insights that would allow them to resist the
myriad and powerful ways in which policy options, 'key issues' and the political
landscape itself get packaged (Fossen and Anderson, forthcoming). But once one
considers the agonistic position that citizen incompetence is more a matter of
an over-readiness to accept the current political offering as given and an lack of
imagination in seeing beyond the present horizon, it becomes clear that current
VAAs have made a politically significant choice to the extent to which they focus
exclusively on ignorance about the policy positions of parties.
A second, parallel point is made by political theorists who see the primary
crisis of citizen incompetence not as ignorance about party positions but rather a
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failure of voters to form well-considered political positions in the first place. The
matching model of VAAs treats the political preferences of citizens as givens, as
authoritative inputs into the process of selecting the party and candidate for whom
to vote. In recent years, however, a wide range of political theorists and political
psychologists have argued that voters not only lack adequate information but also
make frequent errors in interpreting the information they have (Somin 2006).
Moreover, although it is sometimes claimed that voters' errors end up cancelling
each other out and are thus unproblematic, evidence is mounting that citizens are
in fact systematically biased in their reasoning about probabilities (Caplan 2008;
Kahneman 2011), in selectively filtering out information that challenges existing
beliefs (Rosenberg 2007), and in falling prey to how issues are framed (Kelly
2012). Especially within deliberative democratic theory, theorists have contested
the very idea that any automatic authority should be given to the political preference
that people simply happen to have. They argue instead that democratic politics is
best understood in terms of trying to work out the best way of resolving social
problems and political challenges (e.g. Bohman and Rehg 1997; Gutmann and
Thompson 1996; Habermas 1996; Goodin 2008). On this view, voting competently
is not a matter of successfully choosing the option that advances one's political
inclinations or material interests, but rather a matter of participating in a problem-
solving civic process, oriented towards a common good — a process that may well
transform one's political preferences. Individual preferences are a suitable guide
to policy- and law-making only if they are well considered, which means they
take the perspective of others into view. This is a fundamentally different point of
departure than is presupposed in matching VAAs, which are built on the premise
that users respond to the VAAs' statements on the basis of positions that they had
taken (or were unsure of) before starting to use the too1.3
From the standpoint of deliberative democratic theory, however, there is
no reason to assume that political opinions should be left unchanged. After all,
deliberative democratic theorists typically argue that the democratic process is
primarily about transforming preferences, rather than aggregating them (though
they often admit that a moment of counting the votes is indispensible in mass
democracies). Here again, then, VAAs take a position on how to strengthen
democracy that is much more contested than they acknowledge.
A third and perhaps even more fundamental presupposition of current VAAs
is thematised in recent work in political theory on the relationship between the
'epistemic' aspirations of a conception of democracy and the scope of the citizen
competence it presupposes. As Jamie Kelly has recently argued (2012), building
on related work by David Estlund (2008), various theories of democracy differ
in terms of the extent to which they see the democratic electoral process as
3. T h i s  is particularly true for those VAAs that aspire to serve as measurement tools, as a form of
polling. Setting this goal commits designers of VAAs to minimising the extent to which users'
individual stand on the issues changes as a result of using the tool, since as a matter of measure-
ment. that would reflect a corruption of the data. Arguably, however, this could be a reason not to
approach VAAs as measurement tools.
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justified on epistemic grounds or non-epistemic grounds. Epistemic approaches
see the point of democratic politics as lying in its distinctive contribution to better
justified, more warranted legislation (and other collective undertakings). Non-
epistemic approaches, by contrast, understand the point of democratic elections
in terms of ensuring stability or avoiding procedural unfairness. Corresponding
to the positions along this epistemic/non-epistemic continuum, Kelly points out
(2012, Ch. 2), these approaches vary in the level of competence that is expected
of citizens. Much less citizen competence is presupposed in conceptions of
democracy that view elections primarily as stability-generating public rituals in
which power alternates between elites, as in elitist theories of democracy (e.g.
Schumpeter 1942; Best and Higley 2010). Once the democratic electoral process
is justified on the basis of its contribution to the adoption of better laws, policies
and governments, then the whole point of elections depends on it being plausible
to assume that voters have a relatively high level of citizen competence needed
for reliably discerning what votes will actually lead to better results. Accordingly,
conceptions of citizen competence - and thus of the mandate for VAAs - differ
not only with regard to type of ability and knowledge involved, but also the extent
to which it is urgently needed. It may well be appropriately prudent for VAAs
to focus on more limited improvements to citizen competence, but this is not
obvious, and should not be treated as such. As is so often the case, concerns with
feasibility amount, in point of fact, to taking a controversial political standpoint.
In each of these three regards, fundamental questions are being asked, within
political theory, about how we ought to think about citizen competence, the ways
in which voters fall short of these standards, and the relative urgency of measures
to raise citizen competence. These are discussions with significant implications for
the potential contribution of VAAs within the democratic electoral process and for
the future design of VAAs.
VAAs and political participation
A second and related way in which VAAs are seen as strengthening democracies
lies in their potential to address another persistent concern among political
commentators: low or declining political participation. VAAs are presented
as lowering the cost of political participation by making the whole process
more convenient (Garzia 2010). Key information is collected in an easily
accessible form, the decision-making process is streamlined, and some have
even suggested allowing valid ballots that could be printed from the VAA (or
submitted electronically) (Ladner et at. 2010: 120-121). In addition, VAAs have
been presented as an antidote to voter disengagement. Stefan Marschall (2008)
has argued, for example, that VAAs can increase voter turnout by heightening
users' awareness of differences between parties and thus of how much is at stake
in the election. For those who don't vote because the parties all seem to be the
same, VAAs can provide an additional motivation by sharpening the perceived
differences. Here again, however, these claims about how promoting participation
strengthens democracy are the topic of lively debates in contemporary political
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theory, debates that make clear that particular ways of setting up VAAs presuppose
understandings of political participation that are contested.
Consider, first, the assumption that increasing voter turnout itself strengthens
democracy. It seems obvious that, other things being equal, higher turnout in-
creases the democratic credentials of elections, since it means that more people
express their preferences, and therefore the outcome can more closely reflect the
will of  the people. Recently, however, a number of political philosophers have
been asking hard questions about the assumed desirability of high voter turnout.
In The Ethics of Voting, Jason Brennan (2011) has argued that citizens who vote
without understanding the issues are engaging in a form of recklessness, since
they are acting without knowing whether their voting behaviour will cause harm
to others (by helping ineffective, ill-willed, or irrational politicians into power).
For Brennan and others (Caplan 2008, Friedman 2006), then, raising voter turn-
out does not necessarily improve the democratic process — not unless the quality of
the democratic process is simply assumed to be a matter of more preferences being
aggregated. As we saw in the previous section, there is a strong tradition in political
theory according to which improvements to the democratic process are measured
in terms of whether the resulting governments and laws are better — more just,
more effective, more legitimate, or more inclusive. In line with this, one could
argue that the only turnout that strengthens democracy is the turnout of competent
citizens who vote responsibly, in the sense of voting in a way that they 'justifiably
perceive to contribute to the common good' (Brennan 2011: Ch. 5, p.133). We are
not claiming here that Bmnnan's view is correct, but rather signaling a concern
that has arisen in the political theory literature and challenges one of the central
justifications of VAAs. And it may well be that the voters who vote as a result of
completing a VAA are also significantly better informed, in which case Brennan's
objections would be rendered moot. But it is not yet clear what psychological
mechanisms would link the two, and we are not aware of any empirical studies that
demonstrate that completing a VAA raises the probability of individual users both
casting a vote and being better informed. The risk that VAA-usage will increase
incompetent (or overconfident) voting may well be worth taking, but it is precisely
the point of these critics that this gamble should not be taken on the basis of
wishful thinking but on a sober assessment of the evidence.
A second challenge to the focus on voter turnout is taken up by theorists who
argue that casting a ballot is not the only, nor perhaps even the most significant,
form of democratic participation, as has been argued emphatically by advocates
of participatory democracy (Pateman 1970, 2012; Barber 1984); the individual act
of casting a ballot is an extremely limited form of participation. It is a private act,
carried out in isolation, and it gives citizens no opportunity to shape the content of
what is being decided. It is far removed from the dynamic contexts of a town hall
meeting or a workers' council, in which participants can see themselves as jointly
and transparently determining the conditions of their cooperation. As Pateman has
recently put the point:
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In a  privatized social and political context in  the twenty-first century,
consumer-citizens need to be extra vigilant and to monitor providers; they
require information, to be consulted, and occasionally to debate with their
fellow consumer-citizens about the services they are offered. In contrast,
the conception of citizenship embodied in participatory democratic theory is
that citizens are not at all like consumers. Citizens have the right to public
provision, the right to participate in decision-making about their collective life
and to live within authority structures that make such participation possible.
However, this alternative view of democracy is now being overshadowed.
(Pateman 2012: 15)
From this perspective, the concern is that the overwhelming focus on increasing
voter turnout serves to undermine recognition of the importance of these other
forms of participation. To the extent that this is the case, the potential success
of VAAs in strengthening electoral turnout might have the paradoxical effect of
weakening other forms of participation by creating the mistaken impression that
concerns about diminished political participation have been adequately addressed.
On the other hand, however, one might see increased electoral participation as a
step on the way to a deeper sense of political mobilisation (Marschall 2008). As
psychological claims about what motivates citizens to become active, informed
participants, these arguments clearly deserve further empirical study. And at the
theoretical level, more work needs to be done to explain the normative significance
of increased turnout.
VAAs and democratic representation
Another sense in which VAAs can be thought to strengthen democracy is by
increasing the extent to which elected representatives mirror or are congruent with
the views of the electorate (Golder and Stramski 2010). Implicit in the construction
of VAAs is the widespread assumption that we have a well-functioning system
of representative government just in cases where the legislative actions taken by
elected representatives match the positions of their constituents. This is reflected
in the exclusive emphasis in many VAAs on matching users' policy preferences
with the policy-plans of candidates or parties: representatives are supposed to
mirror the will of voters. Yet here again, the proper understanding of the relation
between the elected and their constituency is a longstanding subject of debate in
political theory, with VAAs tacitly assuming one side in the debate.
The central debate here turns on a classical, if somewhat crude (Rehfeld 2009),
distinction between seeing representatives as 'trustees' who are to act according to
their best judgment as to the common good, and seeing them as 'delegates' who are
to act on the wishes of their constituents (Pitkin 1967). In these terms, if one adopts
a delegate model of democratic representation, then it is rational to favour electoral
designs that select representatives whose positions regarding the legislative agenda
are closely aligned with the positions of voters. And this fits well with what many
VAAs aim to do, by matching voters and parties or candidates according to their
224 I  Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates
policy preferences (rather than, say, their preferences for political ideology, group
identification, or leadership style). Indeed, the emphasis on issues is something
VAAs frequently mentioned as a way of encouraging voters to engage with
matters of substance, rather than distracting candidate images and soundbites (de
Graaf 2010; Nuytemans etal. 2010). This issue-oriented understanding of political
substance suggests that developers are committed to a delegate rather than trustee
conception of representation. Users are supposed to choose policies; the tool
finds those candidate-representatives who mirror those preferences most closely.
Although VAAs seem to take i t  for granted, this delegate model o f
representation is contested by many political theorists. If, for example, one affirms
a view of representation as trusteeship, which allows elected representatives more
discretion, considerations other than policy preferences can and should count
for voters at the ballot box. In selecting good trustees, it matters less whether
they pursue specific policies that their constituents endorse and more whether
they can maintain the people's trust (Manin 1997; Mansbridge 2003). From that
perspective, it becomes crucial to promote electoral procedures (and VAAs) that
focus on other aspects, such as candidates' leadership competence, expertise, or
commitment to values and principles. Current matching VAAs seem compatible
with a trustee conception to a limited extent insofar as one takes policy positions
as indicative of underlying ideological commitments, but other pertinent aspects
are typically left out. Moreover, questions arise about the degree to which VAAs
capture the relevant ideological dimensions and whether user responses really
reflect underlying values and principles.
Recent developments in the debate about democratic representation have
further complicated the picture of representation as a principal—agent relation
between the electorate and the elected (whether as trustees or delegates) (Dovi
2011; Urbinaty and Warren 2008). Some theorists argue that establishing fair
representation of marginalised groups and maintaining their trust calls for special
forms of group representation (Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999). Others have
argued for acknowledgment that representatives have a constitutive role in shaping
and articulating the interests and preferences of those being represented (Disch
2011; Saward 2010). Saward, for instance, argues that political representation in
general, and democratic representation more specifically, should be understood in
terms of the ongoing activity of making and contesting 'representative claims'.
In his view, the elected representative is a special case of formally recognised
representative, but by no means the only form — representative claims (claims to
speak on behalf of some constituency) can be legitimately made and backed up by
a variety of political actors (Rehfeld 2006). The upshot of the recent debate has
been to significantly broaden the notion of representation, as well as to challenge
the opposition between direct and representative democracy, since any form of
democratic rule involves some form of representative claim (Nasstrom 2006).
These theoretical developments reveal the complexity o f  political
representation, but surprisingly little work has been done to show how these
conceptual developments feed back into and enhance our understanding of
democratic elections, and consequently more work is needed to assess their
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implications for VAAs. What is clear, however, is that it would be a highly
controversial assumption to claim that democratic representation is simply a
matter of mirroring voters' policy preferences.
Conclusion: Contested neutrality and justifying VAAs
We have argued that current VAAs are premised on assumptions about what
strengthens democracies, assumptions that may seem obvious but that are, in fact,
hotly contested in political theory. In highlighting the competing conceptions of
citizen competence, political participation, and democratic representation, we have
not made any claims about which conception is more appropriate. Our point is
rather that none of these conceptions can simply be assumed, without justification,
as a standard for evaluating VAAs. In this closing section we will discuss some of
the implications of our analysis, with particular attention to the responsibilities of
developers.
As more and more voters rely on VAAs, the developers of VAAs incur
significant responsibilities to demonstrate that they can be trusted, that they do
not mislead or manipulate users, that they do not have conflicts of interest, that
they adhere to methodological best practices, and so on. In this vein, Ladner et at
(2010) have argued for the importance of standards of quality and transparency in
VAAL Their discussion focuses on the dangers of insufficient scientific quality, as
well as bias and intentional manipulation.
Because VAAs can be more than toys, political scientists should not stay
away from them. It is their responsibility too that such tools are set up as
transparently as possible on the grounds of scientific knowledge about political
issues and the political space. In order to prevent possible distortions these
tools have to be researched continuously. In this respect, scientists could be
held accountable. (Ladner etal. 2010: 117)
While we endorse their point that there is no uniquely correct way of setting
up a VAA and their call for best practices in VAA development, there is also a
danger of assuming that methodological rigour and scientific expertise guarantee
legitimacy.
Designers of VAAs frequently position themselves as playing a neutral role
in mediating between voters and political parties or candidates. This neutrality
is thought to be demonstrated by their claims to political expertise. On this
understanding, VAA developers do not themselves take a political stance but
merely help citizens to orient themselves in the landscape as they (developers) find
it. Accordingly, what is taken to be decisive for the justification of VAA designs is
their ability to provide a neutral mapping of the political landscape that provides a
place for everyone, such that the subjective preferences of users can be mapped onto
what is presented as an objective depiction of the political landscape. This focus
on proceduralist neutrality explains why debates over the methodological rigour
and accurate measurement of VAAs are so heated — and so important. At the same
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time, in our discussion of what VAAs presuppose regarding citizen competence,
political participation and democratic representation, we have seen several
ways in which non-partisanship between parties in an election is not the same
as neutrality. Indeed, an overly scientific conceptualisation of VAAs carries the
danger of obscuring those presuppositions (Fossen and Van den Brink, 2014, n.d.;
Fossen and Anderson forthcoming). Even when developers of a VAA successfully
avoid favouring a particular party (which itself is no minor accomplishment),
they still take sides — implicitly or not — on questions about citizen competence,
political participation and democratic representation. As we have seen, for some
political theorists the improvements to the democratic process that are needed are
decidedly radical: not (merely) knowledge about party positions, but about the
issues and the alternatives; not (merely) higher levels of voter turnout, but deeper
and stronger forms of political participation; not (merely) a higher level of issue-
based congruence between the electorate and the legislature, but a rethinking of
democratic representation and of the role of political leaders.
The upshot of this is that, to the extent to which the design of a VAA is justified
on the basis of its contribution to strengthening democracy, it unavoidably takes
a political stance regarding the understanding of democracy thereby presupposed.
It is part of the responsibility of designers of VAAs to be open and transparent
about these issues. For all we know, the presuppositions of current matching
models — in terms of a social choice theory of democracy; a minimalistic, voting-
centred conception of political participation; and a delegate model of democratic
representation — might be vindicated. But, certainly for the foreseeable future,
these assumptions about the ideals of democracy will continue to be contested.
